PRIVATE LETTERS 

on t6e 

EASTERN QUESTION, 



WRITTEN AT THE DATES THEREON, 



(FIRST PUBLISHED FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION) 



VISCOUNT PONSONBY. 



WITH AN ADDITIONAL LETTER. 



BRIGHTON: 

ROBERT FOLTHORP, ROYAL LIBRARY, NORTH STREET. 

AND 

J. R IDG WAY, PICCADILLY, LONDON*. 
1854. 



BY 



:) o, 




A REPRINT, 



Price, One Shilling. 



BRIGHTON : 
PRINTED BY W. FLEET AND SON, HERALD-OFFICE. 

MDCCCLIV, 



The Letters, written to a friend, and solely 
for the purpose of conveying to him my 
opinions, may possibly be of some small use 
if made known more publicly — much in them 
having been verified, as will be evident when 
their respective dates are noticed. The truth 
of the past is often some guide for the conduct 
of present affairs. 



[copy.] 



November 17, 1853. 

My dear Lord, — 

The great interest I take in the Eastern 
Question impels me to write oftener than I 
.otherwise should do. I have seen in the 
newspapers an article extracted from the 
journal edited by Mons. De la Guerroniere, 
who is, as I am told, supposed to speak often 
the opinion or views of Napoleon. In that 
article there is assumed that the Mediatorial 
Powers (what he calls Europe) have a right 
to establish a Peace ; — that is, to determine 
the terms upon which Prussia and Turkey shall 
conclude the War. 

I will not attempt to obtain your attention 



6 



to what I could say for the purpose of ex- 
hibiting the absurdity of the doctrine set up ; 
but I will say that, if it shall be applied in the 
case adverted to above, it will be an act of 
flagrant injustice to Turkey. 

The French and English Governments have 
been engaged to mediate, because they were 
bound, by treaty, to preserve the integrity of 
the Ottoman territory, — to which treaty the 
Russians were a party. The Russians violated 
that treaty by the occupation of the Ottoman 
territory, in order to force the Sultan to con- 
cede certain things demanded by the Russians. 
The French and English Governments made 
-propositions for the establishment of peace, 
which were rejected by Russia in one in- 
stance, by Turkey in the other, and by Russia 
at a subsequent period. The Mediators did not 
pretend to have a right to enforce upon 
the Russians or upon the Turks the acceptance 
of such an arrangement as may suit the 
Mediators. That would be, in the first place, 
an arbitrary despotic act of power, and a prin- 
ciple, if admitted, which would justify the 
coercion that a strong State might think fit 
to employ against a weaker. It would, in 
the next place, be an act of extreme partiality 
to the Russians and of oppression exercised as 



7 



to the Turks. The latter have been assailed 
with a military force by the Russians, without 
even a pretext that has borne a colour of right ; 
they have been forced to defend themselves, 
and war has ensued. 

Every writer upon International Law de- 
clares, that a war puts an end to treaties 
between the belligerents — the treaties by 
which Russia has from time to time emascu- 
lated Turkey. Will the Mediators force the 
Sultan to reanimate those destructive Treaties 
wrested formerly from the weakness of the 
Turks, and made for the purpose of ensuring 
the continuation of that weakness, so as to 
enable Russia to repeat her aggressions 1 
Will France and England combine to force 
the Sultan to forego the use of the advan- 
tages he may have obtained by the valour of 
his troops, and skill of his generals, and de- 
votion of his subjects ? Will France and 
England force him whom they call Ally to 
reinstate his enemy in the possession of those 
territorial possessions'"' which have been so 
lately notoriously used to favour attack upon 
him ? Will France and England, under the 
disguise of love for peace, replace in the hands 
of Russia, territories which will facilitate a re- 



* Seo note (a) at the end. 



8 



newal of attempts at conquest, and, therefore, 
be a constant excitement to that very thing, 
war, which France and England profess to 
hinder ? Supposing that Ottoman armies 
should be able to drive the Russians from 
Bessarabia, would France and England forbid 
the Sultan from repossessing himself of that 
frontier which formerly fortified his Empire, 
and which later events have proved to be 
almost necessary for its safety ? Will France 
and England force the Sultan to break the 
treaties he has now made with the Circassians, 
and other people in and about the Circassian 
country ? Will France and England force the 
Ottomans not to use the fleet which by their 
skill and foresight they have created to supply 
the loss which England inflicted upon them at 
Navarino ; and forbid the employment of that 
arm where, if used, it MAY be found superior 
to the fleet of Russia (their mortal enemy) ? 
Will France and England insist upon the re- 
establishment of the prohibition of the pas- 
sage of the Bosphorus to ships of war, by 
which the Black Sea was made a sort of 
peculium for Russia ? And, to conclude, I will 
ask, wiH France and England again believe in 
the faithful performance of treaties by the 
Russians ? The world will nob credit such a 



thino-. The world will think that the Govern- 
ments of France and England have in view 
other ends than the one that is asserted to be 
theirs — Peace. 

Ever yours, 
(Signed) PONSONBY. 



[copy.] 

Saturday, 19 th November. 
My dear Lord, — 

I pointed out for your observation the arti- 
cle written by De la Guerroniere, Editor of 
the Coastitutionnel and the Pays. I see the 
same doctrine is taken up substantially by the 
Times. I presume, therefore, that it is to be 
adopted by the Ministers. I beg you will 
take it into your consideration. I think you 
will, on examination, be of my mind respecting 
it ; that, at least, you will agree with me in 
part of what I have written to you on the 



10 



point. I propose now to offer an observation 
or two in addition. 

You speak of the danger of a rising in 
Poland if the Turks are successful against 
the Russians. You can tell me if there exists 
a Polish army, — and, if there is such a thing, 
how it is to be officered. The last Revolu- 
tion was made by the army, which had been 
formed in a great measure by Constantine, 
but was truly Polish. That Revolution was 
put down by the folly of the people of War- 
saw, with their Clubs, and all the other usual 
nonsense of Democratic Revolutionists. The 
army was damaged most essentially by the 
destruction of the unity of power of command ; 
and when the crisis came, the people were, 
as always is the case, nul. 

I think the question, then, is — Is there a 
Polish army that will, or will not, oppose the 
Russians ? If the plans, which I believe to 
be now in contemplation, shall be carried into 
effect, and force shall be used to put down 
the Turks in order to protect the Russians, 
then, most certainly, the Turks will do their 
best to raise rebellion in Poland, and in Hun- 
gai-y also. It will be the interest of the 
Turks to do so. If the Turks are allowed 
to enjoy their right to support their own 



11 



cause, they will have no interest in raising 
up revolutionary party in Poland or in Hun- 
gary. If the Turks gain by conquest the 
possession of those portions of their ancient 
territory which the Russians have in later 
times wrested from them, they may be in a 
state of security which will induce and enable 
them to be the zealous friends of peace, and 
perfectly without motives for disturbing their 
neighbours. If the plan of coercion is carried 
into effect, the interest of the Turks will be to 
disturb those neighbours. What then means 
may be, I do not mean to enquire now. The 
plan is a foul breach of justice and law ; it is 
also an act of treachery. We must be dupes to 
enter into it ; and, as sure as God made Moses, 
the British Ministers who are guilty of such 
an act will be made by the country to suffer 
for the deed. 

Yours ever, 
(Signed) PONSONBY. 



12 



[copy.] 
November 29th, 1853. 

I write because I have something I like to 
talk about, and also because you desired me to 
write upon the subject (worn out though it be) 
of the Turkish affairs. I am not deceived by 
what I read in the Times, and also in some other 
journals. The Mediating Powers are occupy- 
ing themselves still in the mockery of a search 
for peace that shall he permanent, and based 
upon their mediation, id est, their dictation. 
Whoever has eyes to read what has been 
written as the records of the efforts made by 
the aforesaid Statesmen must be fully aware 
that a peace so made must be one to please the 
Russian Emperor. 

Every man who is not wholly ignorant of 
Turkey, of Russia, and of Europe generally, 
will see that such a peace will be the forerunner 
of a, war which will produce the very evils which 
our wise men of Gotham make it their pride 
to prevent. I mean a war in which the revolu- 
tionary principles will be called into action. 
A peace that shall dissatisfy Turkey and do 
injury to that country, will force the adoption 
by the Ottoman Government of a policy that 



13 



otherwise would be contrary to the interest of 
the Sultan. 

The Turks are too much excited, they are 
too far advanced in the patriotic defence of 
their country to concur fairly and truly in any 
arrangement that shall not contain in it se- 
curity against future attacks, and the, obvious 
to them, danger of leaving in the hands of 
the Russians those territories which have en- 
abled Nicholas to cany into effect his known, 
— I might say, acknowledged, — design to seize 
upon the Empire. 

No Turk will ever again trust in the aid of 
Allies ; he will look to his own means, and he 
will not be scrupulous as to the nature of 
them, when he shall have palpable proof that 
he cannot trust those who have professed to be 
his friends, and have said that their own 
interest engaged them to be so. The means 
to which the Turks will naturally resort will 
include the encouragement by them, of every 
party in Poland, in Hungary, in Austi'ia, in 
Italy, in France. How much the Turks may 
be able to effect in that way it is not for me to 
say, but I think it will be more than can be 
agreeable to any of the other Governments. 

Now, with respect to the Russians, I cannot 
see even the slightest possibility of any such 



14 



result from a fair and reasonable arrangement 
of the matter in a way displeasing to Nicholas. 
No Liberal, no revolutionary partisan, will raise, 
or endeavour to raise up a disturbance against 
those who have opposed his views of conquest. 
They, on the contrary, will be gratified by his 
failure, rather than excited to aid or to avenge 
him. If he shall be weakened by this failure of 
his plans against Turkey, he may be attacked in 
Poland ; but that attack would not, by any 
means, necessarily involve us or Europe in the 
conflict. The Hungarian mountebanks, like 
Kossuth, might exult and make a noise ; but 
Austria need have no fear of that. There 
would be Newspaper Insurrections in Italy. 
The power of France, under the influence of 
Napoleon, would be fully sufficient to keep 
down all really demagoguish movements, that 
had no more solid support than the intrigues 
of disappointed intriguers, or foolish philoso- 
phers. But give to the mass of ambitious 
malcontents a substratum, such as the natural 
and national discontent of the Turkish Go- 
vernment and People, and those who in their 
scattered state must be physically feeble, 
might, having a head and a growing nucleus, 
become formidable. 

Reinstate Russia in her possession of those 



15 



..itorial positions, by means of which the 
present political crisis was prepared, and let 
those means, as they certainly would do, ex- 
cite the Russian Chief to return to the pur- 
suit of his object, he would not be stopped 
by his present check : he would not hesitate 
to sin again. " Repentance is but want of 
power to sin." The Russian Emperor will 
soon recover a slight wound. He should be 
disabled, and such real security be obtained 
by Turkey as to make him impotent for the 
gratification of his passions. 

Suppose, however, that by pursuing the 
policy in fashion with our Ministers, that 
Russia shall be placed in a position, sooner 
or later, to acquire the object of the Russian 
ambition. What would be the consequence ? 
Would not all Europe be engaged in war to 
resettle the balance of power upon some more 
safe basis ? Would Europe leave Russia in 
possession of the Ottoman Empire, or of the 
Ottoman city, Constantinople ? I say, no ; 
France would not submit to it ; even Austria 
could not, though that Emperor should have 
originally shared the prey with Russia. An 
English Minister, indeed, and his Cabinet 
might yield to the fear of war, but the English 
nation would not. 



16 



I conclude. The present pusillanimity is 
the promoter of danger ; it is the fosterer of 
shame ; it is the offspring of ignorance ; it has 
disgraced the country in the eyes of other 
nations. No one can afford to be hated unless 
he be feared. 

Yours ever, 
(Signed) PONSONBY. 



[copy.] 

Monday, December 19, 1853. 
My deae Lord, — 

The Times having made some hypothetical 
remarks, continues thus : " But if no move- 
ment of the fleets had taken place, the Porte 
may be rendered more amenable to the counsels 
of its Allies by the strong probability that it 
can neither command the Black Sea, nor hold 
its ground by land without their support." 

This clearly exhibits the desire that the 
Turks may be forced to submit to such terms 
of peace as the Allies may think fit to impose 
upon them. It would be ridiculous to expect 



17 



that our Ministers would pretend to impose 
terms upon the Emperor of Russia. They are 
for coercing the weak and yielding to the 
strong. The Romans took pride in the con- 
trary : " Par cere subjectis debellare superbos" 
suited their taste. English Ministers, having 
with them the support of France, are afraid of 
the Emperor of Russia ! This is a triumph 
indeed for our French rivals. The exhibition 
of what England is made to appear to be 
is worth much to Napoleon. He cannot be 
classed, in fact, with his Allies. The world is 
too well acquainted with facts for that. 

Picture for yourself the result of the suc- 
cess of this Ministerial plan, if it shall succeed. 
Russia victorious over England and France, 
ostensibly combined to keep their treaties 
from violation ; both of them professing to see 
that the material interests of the two countries 
are deeply concerned in the security of the 
Turkish Empire ; knowing that the Russian 
Government has repeatedly attacked it, to ob- 
tain more territory, before this last act of 
spoliation was attempted under hypocritical 
pretences ; knowing, also, that the Emperor 
has always professed one thing with regard to 
Turkey and done the contrary ; knowing that 
our fear is now the cause of this ; and imagine 
any ground upon which a man, endowed even 



18 



with common understanding, can believe that 
any treaty that will be made by the Allies for 
the establishment of peace between Russia and 
Turkey can he secure ! If the Sultan shall be 
forced to it, the triumph of Russia will be over 
England, and, to a certain degree, over France, 
though it is well known, that the latter was 
willing and ready to take a bold and honest 
part at the first moment of the Russian 
aggression. 

Who will hereafter believe in the wisdom, 
the courage,, or the honesty of the British 
Government ? Who can fail to see that 
Russia will be encouraged to repeat her 
assaults by the certainty that the terror she 
inspires into English Ministers will at any 
future time enable her to rob as well as to 
bully with success % 

I flatter myself that many voices will be 
raised in the House of Lords to make known 
to the world the truths I have here stated to 
you. I believe that even my own, most in- 
significant as it is, would be sufficient to do it. 
I am sure that our countrymen are not poor- 
spirited enough, and sordid lovers of economy 
(as it is miscalled) to a degree that will make 
them approve of what has been done. 

Ever yours, 

(Signed) PONSONBY. 



10 



[copy.] 

December 24th, 1853. 

My Dear Lord, — 

Were I to remain silent respecting the 
Eastern Question you would imagine me to 
be forced by illness to do so ; and, knowing that 
such an idea would be unpleasant to you, I 
write to prove that I am not incapacitated by 
any ailment. 

The subject itself has an intrinsic impor- 
tance that makes it less dull than it would be, 
in consequence of its never-ceasing discussion 
by friends and foes ; for it is one, the treatment 
of which in action, will affect the basis upon 
which the political state of the world has 
rested. 

I am aware that what I have just said is 
very common- place declamation ; but it is true. 
I maintain that if the plans of the Govern- 
ments of England and Austria succeed, Europe 
will have no peace to rejoice in for years to 
come. The plan, as it is developed in the pro- 
ceeding of the Mediatorial Conferences, and 
published under date 5th December, is in sub- 
stance the preservation to Russia of all those 
territories which Russia held in virtue of 
treaties, which treaties are now abrogated by 



20 



the existence of war between Russia and 
Turkey. It is a plan to force the Sultan to 
accept a state of vassallage, to break faith 
with his allies in Asia, to disgust all his 
most faithful subjects, and to deprive himself 
of a chance of future resistance to the will of 
Russia.** 

The plan springs from treachery, or from 
namby-pamby nonsense, or gross ignorance. I 
have not said that Napoleon will carry it into 
execution ; I feel confident that he will not. 
He has too much sense, too much taste, too 
much courage, too much knowledge of politics 
to take such a part. 

I expect to hear shortly that he has engaged 
in hostilities against the Russians. He must 
well know that we will not dare to thwart his 
will, though we may run away ! I am shocked 
by the things I hear said by quiet men. 

There is a way, and I think it is a likely 
one, to get England out of the filth in which 
she is attempted to be smothered. I expect 
that fortune will save her by making a war 
break out between her and Russia in spite 
of the British Government. Events already 
have defeated more than half of the schemes 
and practices engaged in by that Govern- 
ment. Every body sees through the flimsy 

* See note (b ) at the end. 



21 



covering used by them to disguise paralytic 
tremors. 

The Absolutist, the Aristocrat, the Consti- 
tutionalist, the Radical, and the Chartist, all 
turn up the nose with expression of scorn at 
the enormous folly as well as at the immeasure- 
able meanness of conduct exposed in the 
sayings and doings of the last eight months. 

I will repeat the substance of a part of one 
of my former letters to you. I ask, does any 
man believe that there will be re-established a 
durable state of things if Russia shall again be 
entitled to act in pursuance of her old treaties 
with Turkey ? Can any one give credit to the 
engagements that may be entered into by 
England, or by France, or Austria, or Prussia, to 
make Russia in future observe her promises ? 
Has not the world seen that those who still 
perhaps call themselves the Allies of the Sultan 
have equivocated, quibbled, and tricked during 
many months to avoid keeping their plighted 
faith ? Is it not palpably true that those 
Powers have asserted their right to compel the 
Sultan to make peace upon such conditions as 
those soi disant Allies think it for their own 
interest to establish ? 

Will not treachery and violence such as have 
been talked of seriously by the Allies, — aye, and, 



22 



in a certain degree, enacted by them, — be reason- 
ably and justly expected to be again practised ? 
Will anybody, in any country, confide in any, 
even tbe most solemn engagements ? 

Force alone. The strong hand will operate, 
and the fine lovers of peace have to trust to 
the sword alone. This may be too much the 
nature of things. I grieve to think that it 
is so. 

Ever yours, 
(Signed) PONSONBY. 



[copy.] 

December 30th, 1853. 

My Dear Lord, — 

With respect to your views of the great 
affair of the East, I am of opinion, as I al- 
ways have been, that the exhibition of any 
vigour in the commencement would have 
placed that affair in an intelligible state, 
instead of its falling into inextricable con- 
fusion from our shilly-shally conduct. 

Had we taken manfully the part which 



23 



our honour and our engagements and our 
national interest called upon us to adopt, we 
in that case should have had ground to call 
upon the Turks to defer to our views in 
the settlement of the quarrel ; but, as things 
have been conducted, I think the Turks 
were in no wise bound to trust to our di- 
rection as to the terms of peace. 

The Turks saw the most unequivocal evi- 
dence of our fears of Russia : they saw in 
every one of our acts the plain manifestation 
of our desire to avoid risking the displeasure 
of Russia. The Turks had, as now they 
have in a still more palpable form, a clear 
knowledge that we were ready and disposed 
to sacrifice the most important interests of 
the Ottoman Empire in order that a war we 
so much dreaded might be avoided. The 
feelings of the Turkish people directed their 
national action. The natural and honest im- 
pulses directed them to take a part, as much 
wiser in my opinion, as it was more honour- 
able in the estimation of every man I have 
heard speak of it, than all the finesse of 
diplomacy. The going forward a little, — the 
going back a little, — the dodging of our 
diplomacy exhibited to the world the fact 
that we were afraid of Russia. 



— — I 



24 

I am certain that had we not been resisted 
by the common sense of the Turks, we should 
have made the ruin of their Empire inevitable. 
I am sorry that the Turks have yielded, as I 
am told they now have done, to any proposition 
made by us for negotiation. I think that if 
they, the Turks, are drawn in to trust England, 
they will ultimately be ruined. My hope is 
(and a very strong hope), that Nicholas, elated 
by his obvious triumph over England — ex- 
hibited to the world in the public acts of that 
country — may refuse or evade even such terms 
as the English Government must, from mere 
shame, noiv propose to him. 

Let the Allies, as they call themselves, with- 
draw their fleet Let them leave to Turkey 
and to Russia to fight the battle out : the 
Turks will gain. They will not be defeated 
by Russia. They will not be forced to restore 
the treaties through which Russia has obtained 
the advantages against Turkey, which have 
been so mischievous ; but it would be better 
for Turkey to undergo any defeat than to 
submit to English diplomacy. 

I know something of the real available 
force of the Russians; and I know something 
of the intrinsic force of the Ottoman Empire, 



25 



now that the people of that country are aware 
for what it is that they have to fight. 

The records of the Russian campaigns in 
1828 and 1829 are not waste papers for me. I 
know also, from an authority which it is im- 
possible to doubt, that enormous as were the 
losses enumerated in the report of the Prussian 
General which you have seen, that the real loss 
experienced by the Russians in those campaigns 
was greater than so reported. 

I do not discuss the question of Tiukey. 
I seek only to express my own opinions when 
I advert to the immense importance of this 
Eastern question to the interest of England, 
and of the coming times of Europe. 

The dispute between Russia and the Porte 
is, whether or not the Russians should be 
masters of the best part of the world. I look 
at the condition of things in this light, and I 
am convinced that the policy adopted by the 
Allies is the straight way to the establishment 
of Russia in that position. 

I think that England is the coimtry that 
will be the greatest loser in power, and that 
what we all know of the Russian means and 
ends in Asia fully shews the fact. 

I am certain that English Ministers, and 
the French also, as it appears, are ready to 



26 



assume the right to dictate the terms of 
peace ; and what those terms will be is to 
me indubitable — that is, the real effectual de- 
pendence of Turkey upon the will of Russia. 

I have no faith in, or respect for the con- 
duct of the Allies. I have seen them from 
the first to the last of their proceedings in 
the Eastern Question act under the influence 
of petty views, of supposed present advantages, 
and in no case looking at the true nature of 
the affair. I have seen them support the 
robber in the work of attacking the weaker 
person, of whom those Allies were the self- 
elected guards. Like a false trustee, ihey have 
permitted the robbery of the man whose 
possession of the estate they were bound to 
defend. 

Ever yours, 
(Signed) PONSONBY. 



27 



[copy.] 

February 17th, 1854. 

Sir, — 

I think it would not be lost time if you 
would employ a few minutes in looking at 
the first article in the Journal des Debats* of 
this day, the 17th. The article is headed 
" Paris, 1 6 Fevrier." You will there see what 
is assumed to be an opinion of the Prussian 
Government, and also an opinion in France, the 
purport of' which is, that the Allies, having 
served and saved Turkey from Russia, the Allies 
should exact from Turkey remuneration for 
their services ; and the proposed remuneration 
seems to be some arrangements made for the 

* Journal des Debate, February 10, 1854. — Extract : After having 
applauded the French despatch addressed to le Comte Jloustier, dated the 
15th Janvier, 1854, generally, it continues : "La protection que l'Europe 
Occidentale accorde en ce moment £1 la Turquie, n"aura pas seulement 
pour effet de conserver l'iutugrite do l'Empire Ottoman ; elle augmentera 
les garanties que dans le double inturet de la religion et de l'humanite 
on doit desircr pour les sujets Chretiens du Sultan. Jamais non plus le 
gouvernement Ottoman n'a accepte plus ouvertement l'intervention 
amicale et civilisatrice des puissances Chr6tienne3.' 

The Dibats then observes : " Ces paroles sont remarqnables ; ainsi il y 
a, pour ainsi dire, deux interventions do l'Occident en Orient, qui 
doivont se euivre et s'fichellonnor : l'intervention gwrriere pour defendre 
la Turquie ; et quand celle-la aura reussi, l'intervention civilisatrice. 
Nous nous attachons plus volontiors a la secondo intervention qu'a la 
premicro ; mais si la premiere est necessaire, et si la marcbe des 6vene- 
ments l'impose, la scconde, nous n'en doutons pas, suivra ot memo accom- 
pagnera la premiere." 

After this there comos a long exposition of the principals and maxima 
of France being " destined to be carried ovcry whero where France carriet 
her aims." 



•28 



further advancement of the Christians of all 
denominations and sects in the Ottoman Empire. 
I ask, what is there that can be given to the 
Christians more than the absolute and uncon- 
trolled exercise of their religion : the total 
liberation of their various priests, the free 
existence of convents and monasteries, the 
security of their Church, and all other things 
that come under the head of freedom, unless 
it be power, political power ? If power is to 
be given to the Christians, how are they to 
be prevented using that power to set up their 
own authority and to put down that of the 
Mahometans ? Turkey, as you well know, is a 
sort of popedom, the Sultan is Kaliff ; the laws 
are the Khoran and the commentaries upon 
that book ; and, necessarily, if the authority of 
the Kaliff and the Khoran, and the Ulema is 
put down, and another power raised up in its 
place, the Ottoman Empire will and must be 
destroyed. This is the way in which I view 
the article in the Debats ; and if I am not in 
error, I would ask what worse could the 
Russians do for the Turks, than would in that 
case be the work of their professed friends 
and saviours ? 

I will not take up your time by canvassing 
this point. How could there be got together 
in Turkey any sufficient number of Christians 



29 



who are agreed in the same doctrine ? There 
are a number of sects differing in a very great 
degree one from another, and animated by 
by strong zeal, each in favour of its own opi- 
nions, and by a considerable degree of hatred of 
other sects. The result, I imagine, of such a 
state of things would be religious disputes, 
most virulent in their character, and possibly 
of a war of religion against religion, the neces- 
sary interference of other countries, and the 
subjugation of Turkey by France, or Austria, 
or Russia, or by some combination for the dis- 
memberment of the country. This assuredly 
would not be a benefit for Europe, because the 
final issue could not be arrived at until after a 
deluge of blood. 

I cannot myself conceive anything more 
mischievous, more foolish, more dishonest than 
such a project would be if carried into effect ; 
and yet what I have cursorily read in the 
Debuts seems to me to be the recommendation 
of such a plan of action. We are accustomed 
to think that the wars of some ages past for 
the propagation of our religious belief by the 
destruction of those who had a different belief, 
was not only a foolish, but a wicked policy ; 
one that was the basis of the Inquisition, one 
that was the principle of all the persecutions 



30 



that took place in various countries of Europe. 
Why should not the Catholics of the Romish 
Church drive the Protestants of the English 
Church from their power and position and seize 
for themselves the prey? Why should not the 
Protestants extirpate the Romanists ? The 
principle is the same. 

In the Times of the 18th, there is a long 
article, which looks very much like one in- 
tended to support the same idea as this, which 
prevails in the writing in the Debats ; from 
which it may, I fear, be suspected that the 
British Government is not adverse to such a 
political act as the demand of remuneration 
from Turkey for English services rendered, 
and that the remuneration should be of the 
nature indicated in the Debats. 

Assuming the carrying into effect the sup- 
posed plan, it may be imagined that internal 
disputes in Turkey would lead to internal war, 
and internal war to foreign interference within 
the territory ; such interference would create 
jealousies ; each Power would look to the pos- 
session of security against the aggrandisement 
of some other Power, and it is probable that 
universal war might be the result. 

Yours, sincerely, 
(Signed) PONSONBY. 



(a) The Province of Bessarabia is extremely fertile. It produces 
corn in such abundance that, after all the wants of its inhabitants are 
supplied, there is still enough of it left to furnish an immense supply for 
the English market. Bessarabia is also enabled by its situation to carry 
on a vast commerce, if freed from artificial obstacles to it. The Danube 
traverses it and falls into the sea by its several mouths at its southern 
extremity. That gTeat River is called the Artery of Germany, and 
deserves the appellation. The Province was obtained in 1812 by the 
Russians, and they engaged by treaty to keep open that mouth by which 
the Danube furnishes the means for transporting goods to the sea. The 
Russians have certainly neglected to keep that channel clear ; and it is 
said that they have contributed to its present ill condition, instead of to 
its preservation in a fit state for commerce. If Bessarabia shall be 
restored to the dominion of the Sultan, it will be his direct and great 
interest to keep the course and ingress of the Danube to the sea in the 
best possible state, and to favour in every way the foreign commerce of 
the countiy for the benefit of Turkey, and Europe geuerally, and England 
in particular. The Province and the River may, therefore, be safely left 
in Turkish hands, and the interest of general commerce will be 
advanced. The political interests that demand the re-lransfer of Bess- 
arabia to the dominion of the Sultan are of the first magnitude. They 
are intimately united with the European necessity for the establishment 
of the future security of the Ottoman Empire against the ambitious 
projects of Russia. Bessarabia, with its natural boundary to the East, 
forms a strong frontier for Turkey to res^t a foe, and if in the hands of 
Russia affords facile means for the promotion of the conquest of Turkey 
by Russia. Policy demands that Bessarabia be restored to the dominion 
of the Sultan, 

(h) The Earl of Clarendon having since made his explanatory speech 
in the House of Lords, in which he declared that the Government is 
determined t > maintain the. integrity of tin Ottoman Empire, I presume 
that His Lordship meant, the Ottoman Empire as it was composed at 
the time last year when tbe Principalities were invaded by the Rus- 
sians : no other date can be taken. This being the case, the integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire which is to be maintained may imply, in fact, 
the restoration to Russia of those territories enjoyed by that Power in 
virtue of Treaties which hate been rendered null and void by war, 
vin'oss Lord Clarendon's declaration is to be limited to the expression of 
his determination that the integrity of the Empire shall bo maintained, 
whatever may be the reverses or dofeats of the Turks. But if it should 
moan that, let the result of tho war bo a peaco, in consequence of suc- 
cesses obtained against Russia, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
should bo defined, as above, and maintained by the Allies, tho con- 
sequences of that policy may be such as to produce great evil, and, 
therefore, it is now do-urablo to obtain an answer to tho question 
proposod. 



